
analyzing-command-and-control-communication
Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom protocols to reverse-engineer beacon patterns, command structures, data encoding, and infrastructure (primary servers, fallback domains, dead drops). Use after reverse engineering reveals network traffic needing protocol analysis or when building detection signatures for a framework like Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, or Sliver.
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Install
Works with every agent the skills CLI supports.
npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-command-and-control-communication- 01
Install
Run the command in your project. The CLI asks which agents to install for.
- 02
Describe the task
Ask your agent for something this skill covers. It loads analyzing-command-and-control-communication automatically when relevant.
- 03
Review the result
The agent follows the SKILL.md steps, scripts and references bundled with the skill.
SKILL.md
The instructions your agent reads when the skill is triggered.
Analyzing Command-and-Control Communication
When to Use
- Reverse engineering a malware sample has revealed network communication that needs protocol analysis
- Building network-level detection signatures for a specific C2 framework (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver)
- Mapping C2 infrastructure including primary servers, fallback domains, and dead drops
- Analyzing encrypted or encoded C2 traffic to understand the command set and data format
- Attributing malware to a threat actor based on C2 infrastructure patterns and tooling
Do not use for general network anomaly detection; this is specifically for understanding known or suspected C2 protocols from malware analysis.
Prerequisites
- PCAP capture of malware network traffic (from sandbox, network tap, or full packet capture)
- Wireshark/tshark for packet-level analysis
- Reverse engineering tools (Ghidra, dnSpy) for understanding C2 code in the malware binary
- Python 3.8+ with
scapy,dpkt, andrequestsfor protocol analysis and replay - Threat intelligence databases for C2 infrastructure correlation (VirusTotal, Shodan, Censys)
- JA3/JA3S fingerprint databases for TLS-based C2 identification
Workflow
Step 1: Identify the C2 Channel
Determine the protocol and transport used for C2 communication:
C2 Communication Channels:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
HTTP/HTTPS: Most common; uses standard web traffic to blend in
Indicators: Regular POST/GET requests, specific URI patterns, custom headers
DNS: Tunneling data through DNS queries and responses
Indicators: High-volume TXT queries, long subdomain names, high entropy
Custom TCP/UDP: Proprietary binary protocol on non-standard port
Indicators: Non-HTTP traffic on high ports, unknown protocol
ICMP: Data encoded in ICMP echo/reply payloads
Indicators: ICMP packets with large or non-standard payloads
WebSocket: Persistent bidirectional connection for real-time C2
Indicators: WebSocket upgrade followed by binary frames
Cloud Services: Using legitimate APIs (Telegram, Discord, Slack, GitHub)
Indicators: API calls to cloud services from unexpected processes
Email: SMTP/IMAP for C2 commands and data exfiltration
Indicators: Automated email operations from non-email processes
Step 2: Analyze Beacon Pattern
Characterize the periodic communication pattern:
from scapy.all import rdpcap, IP, TCP
from collections import defaultdict
import statistics
import json
packets = rdpcap("c2_traffic.pcap")
# Group TCP SYN packets by destination
connections = defaultdict(list)
for pkt in packets:
if IP in pkt and TCP in pkt and (pkt[TCP].flags & 0x02):
key = f"{pkt[IP].dst}:{pkt[TCP].dport}"
connections[key].append(float(pkt.time))
# Analyze each destination for beaconing
for dst, times in sorted(connections.items()):
if len(times) < 3:
continue
intervals = [times[i+1] - times[i] for i in range(len(times)-1)]
avg_interval = statistics.mean(intervals)
stdev = statistics.stdev(intervals) if len(intervals) > 1 else 0
jitter_pct = (stdev / avg_interval * 100) if avg_interval > 0 else 0
duration = times[-1] - times[0]
beacon_data = {
"destination": dst,
"connections": len(times),
"duration_seconds": round(duration, 1),
"avg_interval_seconds": round(avg_interval, 1),
"stdev_seconds": round(stdev, 1),
"jitter_percent": round(jitter_pct, 1),
"is_beacon": 5 < avg_interval < 7200 and jitter_pct < 25,
}
if beacon_data["is_beacon"]:
print(f"[!] BEACON DETECTED: {dst}")
print(f" Interval: {avg_interval:.0f}s +/- {stdev:.0f}s ({jitter_pct:.0f}% jitter)")
print(f" Sessions: {len(times)} over {duration:.0f}s")
Step 3: Decode C2 Protocol Structure
Reverse engineer the message format from captured traffic:
# HTTP-based C2 protocol analysis
import dpkt
import base64
with open("c2_traffic.pcap", "rb") as f:
pcap = dpkt.pcap.Reader(f)
for ts, buf in pcap:
eth = dpkt.ethernet.Ethernet(buf)
if not isinstance(eth.data, dpkt.ip.IP):
continue
ip = eth.data
if not isinstance(ip.data, dpkt.tcp.TCP):
continue
tcp = ip.data
if tcp.dport == 80 or tcp.dport == 443:
if len(tcp.data) > 0:
try:
http = dpkt.http.Request(tcp.data)
print(f"\n--- C2 REQUEST ---")
print(f"Method: {http.method}")
print(f"URI: {http.uri}")
print(f"Headers: {dict(http.headers)}")
if http.body:
print(f"Body ({len(http.body)} bytes):")
# Try Base64 decode
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(http.body)
print(f" Decoded: {decoded[:200]}")
except:
print(f" Raw: {http.body[:200]}")
except:
pass
Step 4: Identify C2 Framework
Match observed patterns to known C2 frameworks:
Known C2 Framework Signatures:
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Cobalt Strike:
- Default URIs: /pixel, /submit.php, /___utm.gif, /ca, /dpixel
- Malleable C2 profiles customize all traffic characteristics
- JA3: varies by profile, catalog at ja3er.com
- Watermark in beacon config (unique per license)
- Config extraction: use CobaltStrikeParser or 1768.py
Metasploit/Meterpreter:
- Default staging URI patterns: random 4-char checksum
- Reverse HTTP(S) handler patterns
- Meterpreter TLV (Type-Length-Value) protocol structure
Sliver:
- mTLS, HTTP, DNS, WireGuard transport options
- Protobuf-encoded messages
- Unique implant ID in communication
Covenant:
- .NET-based C2 framework
- HTTP with customizable profiles
- Task-based command execution
PoshC2:
- PowerShell/C# based
- HTTP with encrypted payloads
- Cookie-based session management
# Extract Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from PCAP or sample
python3 << 'PYEOF'
# Using CobaltStrikeParser (pip install cobalt-strike-parser)
from cobalt_strike_parser import BeaconConfig
try:
config = BeaconConfig.from_file("suspect.exe")
print("Cobalt Strike Beacon Configuration:")
for key, value in config.items():
print(f" {key}: {value}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Not a Cobalt Strike beacon or parse error: {e}")
PYEOF
Step 5: Map C2 Infrastructure
Document the full C2 infrastructure and failover mechanisms:
# Infrastructure mapping
import requests
import json
c2_indicators = {
"primary_c2": "185.220.101.42",
"domains": ["update.malicious.com", "backup.evil.net"],
"ports": [443, 8443],
"failover_dns": ["ns1.malicious-dns.com"],
}
# Enrich with Shodan
def shodan_lookup(ip, api_key):
resp = requests.get(f"https://api.shodan.io/shodan/host/{ip}?key={api_key}")
if resp.status_code == 200:
data = resp.json()
return {
"ip": ip,
"ports": data.get("ports", []),
"os": data.get("os"),
"org": data.get("org"),
"asn": data.get("asn"),
"country": data.get("country_code"),
"hostnames": data.get("hostnames", []),
"last_update": data.get("last_update"),
}
return None
# Enrich with passive DNS
def pdns_lookup(domain):
# Using VirusTotal passive DNS
resp = requests.get(
f"https://www.virustotal.com/api/v3/domains/{domain}/resolutions",
headers={"x-apikey": VT_API_KEY}
)
if resp.status_code == 200:
data = resp.json()
resolutions = []
for r in data.get("data", []):
resolutions.append({
"ip": r["attributes"]["ip_address"],
"date": r["attributes"]["date"],
})
return resolutions
return []
Step 6: Create Network Detection Signatures
Build detection rules based on analyzed C2 characteristics:
# Suricata rules for the analyzed C2
cat << 'EOF' > c2_detection.rules
# HTTP beacon pattern
alert http $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX C2 HTTP Beacon";
flow:established,to_server;
http.method; content:"POST";
http.uri; content:"/gate.php"; startswith;
http.header; content:"User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0)";
threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 5, seconds 600;
sid:9000010; rev:1;
)
# JA3 fingerprint match
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX TLS JA3 Fingerprint";
ja3.hash; content:"a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1";
sid:9000011; rev:1;
)
# DNS beacon detection (high-entropy subdomain)
alert dns $HOME_NET any -> any any (
msg:"MALWARE Suspected DNS C2 Tunneling";
dns.query; pcre:"/^[a-z0-9]{20,}\./";
threshold:type threshold, track by_src, count 10, seconds 60;
sid:9000012; rev:1;
)
# Certificate-based detection
alert tls $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (
msg:"MALWARE MalwareX Self-Signed C2 Certificate";
tls.cert_subject; content:"CN=update.malicious.com";
sid:9000013; rev:1;
)
EOF
Key Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Beaconing | Periodic check-in communication from malware to C2 server at regular intervals, often with jitter to avoid pattern detection |
| Jitter | Randomization applied to beacon interval (e.g., 60s +/- 15%) to make the timing pattern less predictable and harder to detect |
| Malleable C2 | Cobalt Strike feature allowing operators to customize all aspects of C2 traffic (URIs, headers, encoding) to mimic legitimate services |
| Dead Drop | Intermediate location (paste site, cloud storage, social media) where C2 commands are posted for the malware to retrieve |
| Domain Fronting | Using a trusted CDN domain in the TLS SNI while routing to a different backend, making C2 traffic appear to go to a legitimate service |
| Fast Flux | Rapidly changing DNS records for C2 domains to distribute across many IPs and resist takedown efforts |
| C2 Framework | Software toolkit providing C2 server, implant generator, and operator interface (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver, Covenant) |
Tools & Systems
- Wireshark: Packet analyzer for detailed C2 protocol analysis at the packet level
- RITA (Real Intelligence Threat Analytics): Open-source tool analyzing Zeek logs for beacon detection and DNS tunneling
- CobaltStrikeParser: Tool extracting Cobalt Strike beacon configuration from samples and memory dumps
- JA3/JA3S: TLS fingerprinting method for identifying C2 frameworks by their TLS implementation characteristics
- Shodan/Censys: Internet scanning platforms for mapping C2 infrastructure and identifying related servers
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Reverse Engineering a Custom C2 Protocol
Context: A malware sample communicates with its C2 server using an unknown binary protocol over TCP port 8443. The protocol needs to be decoded to understand the command set and build detection signatures.
Approach:
- Filter PCAP for TCP port 8443 conversations and extract the TCP streams
- Analyze the first few exchanges to identify the handshake/authentication mechanism
- Map the message structure (length prefix, type field, payload encoding)
- Cross-reference with Ghidra disassembly of the send/receive functions in the malware
- Identify the command dispatcher and document each command code's function
- Build a protocol decoder in Python for ongoing traffic analysis
- Create Suricata rules matching the protocol handshake or static header bytes
Pitfalls:
- Assuming the protocol is static; some C2 frameworks negotiate encryption during the handshake
- Not capturing enough traffic to see all command types (some commands are rare)
- Missing fallback C2 channels (DNS, ICMP) that activate when the primary channel fails
- Confusing encrypted payload data with the protocol framing structure
Output Format
C2 COMMUNICATION ANALYSIS REPORT
===================================
Sample: malware.exe (SHA-256: e3b0c44...)
C2 Framework: Cobalt Strike 4.9
BEACON CONFIGURATION
C2 Server: hxxps://185.220.101[.]42/updates
Beacon Type: HTTPS (reverse)
Sleep: 60 seconds
Jitter: 15%
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
URI (GET): /dpixel
URI (POST): /submit.php
Watermark: 1234567890
PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
Transport: HTTPS (TLS 1.2)
JA3 Hash: a0e9f5d64349fb13191bc781f81f42e1
Certificate: CN=Microsoft Update (self-signed)
Encoding: Base64 with XOR key 0x69
Command Format: [4B length][4B command_id][payload]
COMMAND SET
0x01 - Sleep Change beacon interval
0x02 - Shell Execute cmd.exe command
0x03 - Download Transfer file from C2
0x04 - Upload Exfiltrate file to C2
0x05 - Inject Process injection
0x06 - Keylog Start keylogger
0x07 - Screenshot Capture screen
INFRASTRUCTURE
Primary: 185.220.101[.]42 (AS12345, Hosting Co, NL)
Failover: 91.215.85[.]17 (AS67890, VPS Provider, RU)
DNS: update.malicious[.]com -> 185.220.101[.]42
Registrar: NameCheap
Registration: 2025-09-01
DETECTION SIGNATURES
SID 9000010: HTTP beacon pattern
SID 9000011: JA3 TLS fingerprint
SID 9000013: C2 certificate match
FAQ
What does the analyzing-command-and-control-communication skill do?
Analyzes malware C2 communication over HTTP, HTTPS, DNS, and custom protocols to reverse-engineer beacon patterns, command structures, data encoding, and infrastructure (primary servers, fallback domains, dead drops). Use after reverse engineering reveals network traffic needing protocol analysis or when building detection signatures for a framework like Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, or Sliver.
How do I install analyzing-command-and-control-communication?
Run npx skills add https://github.com/mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills --skill analyzing-command-and-control-communication in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/ (personal) or .claude/skills/analyzing-command-and-control-communication/ (project).
Which AI agents can use analyzing-command-and-control-communication?
Any agent that supports the open Agent Skills format (a folder with a SKILL.md file), including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode and more.
Is analyzing-command-and-control-communication safe to install?
No partner security audit is available yet. Skills can run commands and scripts, so read the SKILL.md and any bundled files before installing.
Who maintains analyzing-command-and-control-communication?
It is published by mukul975 in mukul975/anthropic-cybersecurity-skills. It has 528 recorded installs.
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