MCPInstall

multi-account-isolation

Verify that browser profiles are actually isolated from one another instead of assuming it - confirm each profile's timezone agrees with its own exit IP, that WebRTC exposes only the proxy, that canvas and WebGL hashes stay identical across relaunches of one profile, and that no two profiles share a persona, a cookie jar, or an address. Use when several of your own accounts or test identities run from one machine and the setup needs checking, when a profile tested clean but something still looks off, when choosing which detection suites to run (CreepJS, whoer, browserleaks WebRTC, pixelscan, liarjs), when auditing what a vendor runtime does with API and proxy credentials, or when asking which layers browser isolation cannot cover at all. Also for 'profile isolation check', 'fingerprint consistency test', 'timezone mismatch', 'WebRTC leak', 'canvas hash unstable', 'account association', 'temporary profile', '防关联', '多账号', '隔离自检'. The SDK is anti-detect-browser; MCP is browser-mcp-agent.

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Install

Works with every agent the skills CLI supports.

npx skills add https://github.com/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills --skill multi-account-isolation
  1. 01

    Install

    Run the command in your project. The CLI asks which agents to install for.

  2. 02

    Describe the task

    Ask your agent for something this skill covers. It loads multi-account-isolation automatically when relevant.

  3. 03

    Review the result

    The agent follows the SKILL.md steps, scripts and references bundled with the skill.

Security audits

Independent scans of the skill's instructions and bundled files.

Gen Agent Trust Hub PassSAFE ·This skill provides a guide for auditing browser profile isolation to prevent account association. It details how to verify that fingerprints, proxies, and session data are correctly separated using the anti-detect-browser SDK and various third-party verification tools.
Socket Warn1 alert: gptAnomaly
Snyk PassLOW ·Risk: LOW · No issues

SKILL.md

The instructions your agent reads when the skill is triggered.

Profile Isolation - verifying it, not assuming it

A profile that looks isolated usually is not. The failures are boring and mechanical: a timezone that does not match the exit IP, a WebRTC candidate carrying the real address, a canvas hash that changes on every read, two profiles that ended up on the same persona. This skill is the check list for catching those before they matter.

Authorized use only. This is for identities you own or are authorized to operate: your own accounts, your own test fixtures, your own QA fleet, and your own anti-fraud stack. It is not for accessing systems without authorization, for accounts that are not yours, or for creating fake accounts or engagement. Comply with the terms of the sites you automate and with applicable law - see Acceptable use.

What this does not claim. Passing every check below means the browser layer is internally consistent. It does not mean a given site will treat two profiles as unrelated: things entirely outside the browser - a shared payment instrument, a shared contact detail, identical activity patterns - are not something any browser setting reaches. Treat a clean result as "the technical layer is not the problem", not as a guarantee.

For the SDK that creates and launches these profiles, see the anti-detect-browser skill.

The configuration invariant

One identity gets one of everything. Any cell shared between two identities is a defect to find:

identity  →  profile  →  persona  →  proxy  →  timezone
   1      :     1     :     1     :    1    :     1

Profiles are unlimited and free on every antibrow plan, so there is never a reason to reuse one. "Log out and log back in as the other identity" inside one profile defeats the entire setup - the cookie jar and localStorage are the point.

Setup under test

import { AntiDetectBrowser } from 'anti-detect-browser'

const ab = new AntiDetectBrowser({ key: process.env.ANTI_DETECT_BROWSER_KEY })

const identities = [
  { profile: 'fixture-us-01', proxy: process.env.PROXY_US_1, tags: ['Windows 10', 'Chrome'] },
  { profile: 'fixture-us-02', proxy: process.env.PROXY_US_2, tags: ['Apple Mac', 'Safari'] },
  { profile: 'fixture-de-01', proxy: process.env.PROXY_DE_1, tags: ['Windows 10', 'Edge'] },
]

for (const id of identities) {
  const { browser, page } = await ab.launch({
    profile: id.profile,              // isolated cookies, storage, login state
    proxy: id.proxy,                  // from the environment, one per identity
    fingerprint: { tags: id.tags },   // drawn once, frozen, replayed after
    label: id.profile,                // address-bar tag drawn by the kernel, unreadable from the page
  })
  // ... run the checks below, then ...
  await browser.close()
}

Python, same on-disk profile format:

import os
from antibrow import launch

with launch(
    profile="fixture-us-01",
    proxy=os.environ["PROXY_US_1"],   # from the environment, never a literal
    geoip=True,            # timezone + WebRTC follow the proxy exit
    label="fixture-us-01",
) as browser:
    page = browser.new_page()
    print(browser.timezone, browser.public_ip)

The checks

Run each profile through its own proxy, and assert rather than eyeball.

#CheckHowFails when
1Timezone matches the exit IPbrowser.timezone vs the country of browser.public_ipgeoip was disabled, or timezone was forced to something the IP contradicts. This is the single most common defect.
2WebRTC exposes only the proxybrowserleaks.com/webrtcICE candidates still carry a local or real public address
3Canvas hash is stable across launchesRead it, close, relaunch the same profile, read againThe two reads differ - a value that changes every read is itself an anomaly, and it means the persona is not frozen
4Worker and main thread agreeCreepJSUA, languages, hardwareConcurrency, timezone or GPU differ when re-read inside a Web Worker
5One GPU across three interfacesCreepJS, or read WebGL / WebGL2 / WebGPU directlyadapter.info.vendor does not match the unmasked WebGL renderer family
6No two profiles share a personaDiff browser.persona across the fleetTwo profiles report the same UA, screen geometry and seeds
7No two profiles share an addressCollect browser.public_ip for the fleetTwo identities came out of the same exit, or the same /24
8Cookie jars are separateCompare browser.profile_dir across the fleet, then inspect user-data/ inside eachTwo identities resolve to one directory, or one directory holds state belonging to another identity
9One identity, one profile treeConfirm every launch of a name passes the same temporary valueA managed gmail and a temporary gmail are two different profiles with two personas and two cookie jars. A script that disagrees with itself about temporary is running two identities under one name and will look like a logged-out session, not like a bug
10Whole-stack coherencewhoer.net, pixelscan.netIP, timezone and locale disagree at a glance
11Consistency rules in CInpx liarjs (liarjs.dev)Any of ~40 open-source cross-layer rules fail - this is the one that runs unattended

Checks 1, 3 and 7 are the ones worth wiring into CI: they are cheap, deterministic, and they catch the defects that actually recur.

Reading a failure

Work down in this order, cheapest first - a fingerprint is almost never the actual cause:

  1. Profile name reused? list_profiles, or compare browser.profile_dir per identity. Two identities in one directory explains everything else. Directories are named after the profile's id, not its name, so match on profile.json inside rather than on the folder name.
  2. Same address twice? Confirm each public_ip is distinct.
  3. Clock disagrees with the address? Print browser.timezone and browser.public_ip together.
  4. Persona regenerated? If the canvas hash moved between launches, the profile is not frozen - check whether profile_dir or the cache directory changed under it.
  5. Only then the fingerprint itself, verified with the suites above rather than assumed.

What the runtime touches, and how to check it

Any tool that drives logged-in sessions receives cookies and proxy credentials, so it is fair to ask what it does with them. For antibrow:

ArtifactWhere it livesWho sees it
Cookies, localStorage, login state~/.anti-detect-browser/profiles/<id>/user-data/ on your disk, or profiles-temp/<id>/ for a temporary profileLocal. Cloud sync is opt-in per profile: a launch never creates a cloud profile by itself, and sync: true is what puts one there. Check which profiles sync before assuming they stay on the machine
Persona (persona.json)same profile directory, written once and frozenLocal
Profile identity record (profile.json)same profile directory; the id it holds is what names the directoryLocal. It is why a rename does not cost a persona, and why the folder name is not the profile name
Proxy URL and its credentialspassed to the kernel at launch; answered in the network stack (HTTP 407 / SOCKS5 RFC 1929) so no extension holds themThe kernel process and your proxy provider
API keyyour environment, or ~/.antibrow/license.keyExchanged with antibrow.com for a short-lived license token, roughly once a day

The kernel is a closed-source Chromium build - that is the tradeoff for the spoofing living in C++ rather than in an injectable script - so verify behaviour rather than take it on faith:

python -m antibrow info          # kernels, profiles, license state, cache dir
browser.plan.redacted_args()     # exact kernel command line, secrets masked - safe to paste in a bug report

Point it at a proxy whose logs you can read, or at a local MITM proxy, and watch what leaves the machine during a launch. Pin the SDK version and check the published hash (npm view anti-detect-browser@2.8.0 dist.integrity) so the code you audited is the code that runs. If a deployment must not phone home at all, this is the wrong tool: license verification is compiled into the kernel and there is no offline mode.

What isolation cannot cover

Worth stating plainly, because a clean check list invites the wrong conclusion:

  • Anything outside the browser. A shared payment instrument, a shared contact detail, a shared payout destination - no browser setting touches these, and they are the strongest correlators that exist.
  • Activity patterns. Identical timing, identical content, identical interaction targets. Not a technical property.
  • Identity verification. A document check is not a fingerprint problem.
  • A platform's own decision. Nothing here changes how a site chooses to treat an account.

If every check passes and something still looks wrong, the cause is in this list, not in the browser layer.

Acceptable use

Intended: verifying isolation between identities you own; running client accounts with the account holder's authorization; building QA fixtures that emulate distinct devices; testing your own anti-fraud and correlation logic; auditing what a browser runtime does with your credentials.

Out of scope, and not supported: accessing any system without authorization; logging into accounts that are not yours; credential stuffing or account takeover; creating fake accounts, reviews or engagement; circumventing an authentication, payment or authorization control; scraping personal data in violation of applicable law; working around a platform's enforcement decision.

Complying with the terms of the platforms being used, and with applicable law, is the operator's responsibility. Report abuse or a security issue via the contact at https://antibrow.com.

Related Skills

  • anti-detect-browser - the SDK, profiles, personas, proxies and REST API that create the setup being verified here
  • browser-mcp-agent - MCP server mode, for letting an AI agent drive a single profile itself

FAQ

What does the multi-account-isolation skill do?

Verify that browser profiles are actually isolated from one another instead of assuming it - confirm each profile's timezone agrees with its own exit IP, that WebRTC exposes only the proxy, that canvas and WebGL hashes stay identical across relaunches of one profile, and that no two profiles share a persona, a cookie jar, or an address. Use when several of your own accounts or test identities run from one machine and the setup needs checking, when a profile tested clean but something still looks off, when choosing which detection suites to run (CreepJS, whoer, browserleaks WebRTC, pixelscan, liarjs), when auditing what a vendor runtime does with API and proxy credentials, or when asking which layers browser isolation cannot cover at all. Also for 'profile isolation check', 'fingerprint consistency test', 'timezone mismatch', 'WebRTC leak', 'canvas hash unstable', 'account association', 'temporary profile', '防关联', '多账号', '隔离自检'. The SDK is anti-detect-browser; MCP is browser-mcp-agent.

How do I install multi-account-isolation?

Run npx skills add https://github.com/antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills --skill multi-account-isolation in your project. The skills CLI detects the agents you use and copies the skill into the right folder. For Claude Code you can also place the skill folder at ~/.claude/skills/multi-account-isolation/ (personal) or .claude/skills/multi-account-isolation/ (project).

Which AI agents can use multi-account-isolation?

Any agent that supports the open Agent Skills format (a folder with a SKILL.md file), including Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, Windsurf, Cline, OpenCode and more.

Is multi-account-isolation safe to install?

Security partners have reviewed it: Gen Agent Trust Hub passed; Socket flagged items to review; Snyk passed. As with any skill, read the SKILL.md and bundled scripts before installing.

Who maintains multi-account-isolation?

It is published by antibrow in antibrow/anti-detect-browser-skills. It has 107,991 recorded installs.

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